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THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
IN CALIFORNIA
The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of
the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A
phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to
its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal
formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and
sometimes contradictory ideas.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Assumption of risk is a negligence defense that has long caused
confusion in definition and application.2 In some settings assumption
of risk is concerned with the parameters of the duty of care a defend-
ant owes a plaintiff. This area of assumption of risk is labeled primary
assumption of risk.3 For example, a spectator who is sitting in the
outfield at a baseball game and is injured by a baseball hit into the
stands cannot maintain a negligence action against the stadium owner.
Primary assumption of risk instructs that the stadium owner does not
owe the spectator a duty of care.4 Since duty is one of the elements of
the prima facie negligence case,5 the spectator is barred from
recovery.
In other areas assumption of risk has been applied to situations
where the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily encountered a risk that
the defendant's breach of duty created. This area of assumption of
risk is labeled secondary assumption of risk.6 Consider the plaintiff
who stands near the defendant while the defendant is carelessly drill-
ing into a piece of metal. The plaintiff knows that the defendant is not
using the drill properly and that it is possible pieces of metal will fly
from the drill. Nonetheless, the plaintiff insists on standing next to the
defendant to get a better view of what the defendant is doing. Unfor-
1. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2. See, e.g., 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.0, at 187-89 (2d
ed. 1986); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at
480-81 (5th ed. 1984); VICrOR SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.1, at 154 (2d
ed. 1986).
3. See infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 164.
6. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
1495
1496 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tunately, the defendant is negligent and the plaintiff is injured when
hit in the eye with a flying piece of metal. Because the plaintiff has
knowingly and voluntarily encountered the risk the defendant's negli-
gent drilling created, secondary assumption of risk bars the plaintiff's
recovery.7
Secondary assumption of risk is further divided into two catego-
ries. If the trier of fact deems it reasonable for the plaintiff to be
standing near the defendant, secondary assumption of a reasonable
risk bars the plaintiff's recovery.8 If the trier of fact decides it was
unreasonable, secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk will bar
the plaintiff's recovery.9
Prior to the adoption of comparative fault,10 courts did not have
any need to distinguish between the different types of assumption of
risk outlined above." However, when California abolished contribu-
tory negligence as a complete defense to negligence and adopted a
comparative fault system,' 2 the need to differentiate between the
forms of assumption of risk arose.
Comparative fault is based on the principle that liability should
be apportioned according to fault. 3 Since contributory negligence
barred recovery even to plaintiffs who only slightly contributed to
their own injuries, the adoption of comparative fault necessitated the
abolition of contributory negligence as a complete defense to
negligence. 4
The adoption of comparative fault necessitated the California
Supreme Court's inquiry into which forms of assumption of risk were
not compatible with the comparative fault system.'5 The California
Supreme Court determined that secondary assumption of an unrea-
sonable risk overlapped contributory negligence and should not re-
main a complete bar to recovery under a comparative fault system. 6
In Knight v. Jewett17 a majority of the court decided that secondary
7. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
8. See infra part II.B.2.b.i.
9. See infra part II.B.2.b.ii.
10. For a discussion of comparative fault, see infra part II.C.
11. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 304, 834 P.2d 696, 700, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 6 (1992).
12. California adopted comparative fault in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
13. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
14. See Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 812-13, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
15. See id at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
16. See id
17. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992).
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assumption of a reasonable risk should meet the same fate while pri-
mary assumption of risk would not.' 8
This Comment examines the California Supreme Court's decision
in Knight, a case that is significant because it attempted to clarify the
effect of the adoption of comparative fault on assumption of risk. This
Comment also includes an explanation of the elements of the tradi-
tional assumption of risk case, as well as a discussion of the different
forms of assumption of risk and how they relate to contributory negli-
gence and comparative fault.19
Part III of this Comment examines California's adoption of com-
parative fault. It then discusses the factual background of Knight as
well as the plurality's reasons for retaining primary assumption of risk
and for abolishing secondary assumption of risk as a separate doctrine
from comparative fault.
In Part IV, this Comment criticizes the plurality's merger of sec-
ondary assumption of risk into the comparative fault scheme.2" Part
IV is also critical of the manner in which the plurality defines primary
assumption of risk.2 '
Finally, this Comment recognizes that courts since Knight have
retained primary assumption of risk as a label for the defendant's lack
of duty. It recommends that the court adopt a definition for primary
assumption of risk separate from the "no duty" label that the doctrine
has garnered in the courts of appeal and in Knight itself.' It then
recommends defining primary assumption of risk cases as those cases
where the risk of the activity is necessarily inherent in-or inevitably
a part of-the activity itself. 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Elements of Assumption of Risk
A defendant's successful assertion of the assumption of risk de-
fense has traditionally required that the plaintiff have a subjective
knowledge and appreciation of the risk.24 Moreover, the plaintiff
18. Id. at 308, 834 P.2d at 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
19. See infra part II.
20. See infra part IV.A.
21. See infra part IV.B.
22. See infra part IV.C.
23. See infra part IV.C.
24. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
June 1995] 149"7
1498 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
must confront the risk voluntarily.' Courts have applied these re-
quirements to all forms of assumption of risk.26
1. Knowledge and appreciation of the risk
To successfully utilize the assumption of risk defense, the defend-
ant must first show that the plaintiff knew of the existence of the risk
and appreciated its danger.27 In order to truly have knowledge and
appreciation of a risk, the plaintiff must not only be aware of what
creates the risk, but must appreciate the character and extent of that
risk?. 8 Thus, a plaintiff may be aware that a piece of property is in
poor condition, but may not know the specific danger the property
presents. Even if it is known, the risk may appear negligible. In such
situations the plaintiff does not assume the risk by using the
property.
29
The plaintiff must know and comprehend the specific risk that
eventually causes harm.30 For example, suppose a plaintiff rents a car
from the defendant, fully understanding that the defendant carelessly
maintained the car's tires. However, the plaintiff does not know that
the defendant also carelessly maintained the brakes. While driving
the car, the plaintiff gets into an accident caused solely by the defec-
tive brakes. Because the plaintiff did not know and comprehend the
specific risk that caused the accident, he or she will not be held to
assume the risk of the car accident. This is true even though it was a
foreseeable consequence of the poorly maintained tires the plaintiff
did know about."'
Knowledge and appreciation of the risk are measured using a
subjective standard geared to the particular plaintiff and the particular
situation.32 For example, a plaintiff whose age or lack of experience
prevents comprehension of a risk will not be held to assume the risk,
even though a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have
25. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 486-92.
27. See Gyerman v. United States Lines Co., 7 Cal. 3d 488, 498 n.10, 498 P.2d 1043,
1049 n.10, 102 Cal. Rptr. 795, 801 n.10 (1972); Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d
158, 161-62, 265 P.2d 904, 906 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. b.
29. See id.
30. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 487.
31. See Robert E. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L.
REv. 122, 126 (1961).
32. See Prescott, 42 Cal. 2d at 161-62, 265 P.2d at 906 (1954); Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75
Cal. App. 3d 874, 878-79, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (1977); RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496A cmt. d.
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understood and appreciated the particular risk involved.33 On the
other hand, the defendant does not need to prove that the plaintiff
foresaw the accident and the exact injury that occurred.34 If the facts
of the case indicate that the plaintiff must have known of a particular
danger, or that the risk was obvious, then he or she will be deemed to
have had actual knowledge of the risk.
2. Voluntary assumption of the risk
Since the basis of the assumption of risk defense is the plaintiff's
consent to accept the risk and look out for him or herself,36 the plain-
tiff must have encountered the risk voluntarily.37 The acceptance of a
risk is involuntary if the defendant's conduct has left the plaintiff no
reasonable alternative to avoid the harm to him or herself or to an-
other s.3  For example, a shipper of vegetables does not assume the risk
of a defective car that a carrier supplied when the only alternative to
shipping the vegetables is to let them rot.39 However, if the plaintiff
has a reasonable course of action,40 but elects to pursue a more dan-
gerous course, then the plaintiff's choice is voluntary.41 For instance,
suppose the city has cleared the snow and ice from the sidewalk on
only one side of a street. The plaintiff, free to choose which side of
the street to walk on, elects the icy side of the street. Since the plain-
tiff chose the more dangerous course of action, the choice was
voluntary.42
The plaintiff's acceptance of the risk will be deemed voluntary if
circumstances beyond the defendant's control compel the plaintiff to
encounter a risk.43 Thus, a plaintiff who cannot find a place to live
33. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 496A cmt. d.
34. See, e.g., Prescott, 42 Cal. 2d at 162, 265 P.2d at 906.
35. hL
36. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 496E cmt. a.
37. Prescott, 42 Cal. 2d at 162, 265 P.2d at 906; RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 496E.
38. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E.
39. See Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. McLean, 118 S.W. 161 (Tex. 1909).
40. Several factors determine whether a reasonable course of action exists. They in-
clude the importance of the interest the plaintiff is seeking to advance, the danger and the
probability that it will occur, the inconvenience of a particular course of conduct compared
to another, and "all other relevant factors which would affect the decision of a reasonable
man under the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 496E cmt. d.
41. Id. In this type of situation the plaintiff may not only have assumed the risk but
will be contributorily negligent for taking the unreasonable course of action. KEETON ET
AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 491.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 496E cmt. d, illus. 9.
43. Id. § 496E cmt. b.
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and must rent the defendant's house, which is obviously dangerous,
will be deemed to have acted voluntarily.44 Even though compulsion
to encounter the risk exists, it does not stem from the defendant's
conduct.
B. The Many Species of Assumption of Risk
Courts and commentators have divided assumption of risk into
several categories.45 The two basic types of assumption of risk are
express and implied assumption of risk.46 Within the implied assump-
tion of risk category two subcategories exist: primary assumption of
risk and secondary assumption of risk.47 Secondary assumption of risk
is further divided into two subcategories: secondary assumption of a
reasonable risk and secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk. 8
1. Express assumption of risk
Express assumption of risk involves a plaintiff who contracts or
expressly agrees49 to accept a risk of harm stemming from a defend-
ant's negligent or reckless conduct."
2. Implied assumption of risk
Implied assumption of risk typically involves a plaintiff who has
knowledge and appreciation of a risk created by the defendant's con-
duct but who chooses to confront the risk anyway.51 Implied assump-
tion of risk does not require the plaintiff's express consent to assume
44. See id.
45. See infra part II.B.1-2.
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 481.
47. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 309, 834 P.2d 696, 704, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 10
(1992).
48. Id
49. Express assumption of risk usually involves a contract that declares that the de-
fendant is not liable to the plaintiff for tortious conduct. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
TORT § 496B cmt. a. Consent to the defendant's conduct can also be noncontractual,
provided that some type of express agreement exists. Id
50. See Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Ctr., 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 344-45, 214 Cal. Rptr.
194,201 (1985); REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B. Since this Comment does not
require an in-depth understanding of express assumption of risk, I only provide a brief
definition.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C.
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the risk of harm. 2 Instead, a plaintiff manifests a willingness to accept
the risk through conduct.1
3
a. primary assumption of risk
Implied assumption of risk consists of two subcategories: primary
and secondary implied assumption of risk. Primary assumption of risk
occurs when a defendant is not negligent, because he or she did not
breach a duty owed to the plaintiff.54 To better understand primary
assumption of risk, it is necessary to look at the common law in the
master-servant context.5 5 At common law, the master had a duty to
provide the servant with a safe place to work. 6 If inherent risks in the
employment situation remained, the master was not liable when those
risks were responsible for the servant's injury.57 The master did not
have to plead the defense; rather, it was the servant who was required
to prove that a risk that was not inherent in an ordinary and similar
work place caused the injury. In other words, primary assumption of
risk is not, and never was, a defense to negligence at all. It was just a
way of saying that the defendant was not negligent because the de-
fendant did not breach a duty he or she owed to the plaintiff.5 9
Primary assumption of risk has expanded beyond the master-ser-
vant context.60 For example, sporting event spectators who are in-
jured by foul balls or hockey pucks flying into the stands are generally
barred from recovery due to primary assumption of risk.61 The own-
ers of a baseball stadium or a hockey rink do not have a duty to screen
every seat from a foul ball or errant puck.62 Rather, their duty is met
if they provide screens for the spectators most likely to encounter in-
52. See Gomes v. Byrne, 51 Cal. 2d 418, 421, 333 P.2d 754, 755-56 (1959); REsTATE-
E Tqr (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 496C cmt. b.
53. See Gomes, 51 Cal. 2d at 421, 333 P.2d at 755-56; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 496C cmt. b.
54. Salinas v. Vierstra, 695 P,2d 369, 372 (Idaho 1985); Meistrich v. Casino Arena At-
tractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959); Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d 1147, 1151 (N.M.
1971).
55. Today, with the promulgation of workers' compensation and other statutes, as-
sumption of risk does not play a significant role in the master-servant context. HARPER Er
AL., supra note 2, § 21.4, at 228 (1956).
56. d.
57. 1&
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 142 (1952).
61. See Modee v. City of Eveleth, 29 N.W.2d 453, 455-57 (Minn. 1947).
62. Id.
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jury, such as those seated immediately behind home plate or in the
first rows of the hockey rink.6
3
The focus on duty is interwoven with the traditional elements of
assumption of risk. Thus, voluntary action in the face of a known and
appreciated risk must also exist before a defendant can successfully
assert primary assumption of risk.64 For instance, in Tancredi v. Dive
Makai Charters65 the deceased went scuba diving on a trip the defend-
ant guided and chartered.66 When the deceased showed up to board
the boat, the defendant informed him that they would be diving at the
"Deep Reef."'67 "The plan was to dive to a maximum depth of 145
feet for a maximum time of 20 minutes, with decompression stops at
20 feet for three minutes and at ten feet for eight minutes.
'6 8
Although the deceased was a certified diver, he was not experienced
enough to participate in a dive that was this deep and included this
many decompression stops.69 After making the dive, the deceased
and the group of other divers began to return to the boat.70 The de-
ceased began to have trouble breathing,71 and began to bleed out of
his nose and mouth.72 He became negatively buoyant and sank to the
ocean bottom.73 Rescue efforts failed, and he died.
74
The defendant asserted primary assumption of risk as a defense.75
The court noted that primary assumption of risk involves two fac-
tors:76 first, whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care;
77
and second, whether the plaintiff with knowledge and appreciation of
the danger, confronted that danger voluntarily.78 The court held that
primary assumption of risk would not bar the plaintiff's recovery.79
63. Id
64. See, e.g., Tancredi v. Dive Makai Charters, 823 F. Supp. 778, 789 (D. Haw. 1993);
Doe v. Brainerd Int'l Raceway, Inc., 514 N.W.2d 811, 820 (Minn. 1994); Martin v. Buzan,
857 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo. 1993) (citing Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1982)).
65. 823 F. Supp. 778 (D. Haw. 1993).
66. Id at 781.
67. Id.
68. Id-
69. Id
70. Id at 782.
71. Id
72. Id
73. I d
74. Id
75. Id at 788.
76. Id
77. Id
78. Id
79. Id at 790.
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The court felt that while the deceased understood some of the risks
involved in diving at 140 feet, he did not comprehend all of them.80
b. secondary assumption of risk
Secondary assumption of risk is applicable when the defendant
has breached a duty of care that he or she owed to the plaintiff."' A
defendant can successfully invoke the defense by showing that the
plaintiff voluntarily confronted a negligently created risk with knowl-
edge and appreciation of that risk.8 Thus, suppose the defendant is
dangerously setting off fireworks next to a public street. The plaintiff,
fully aware of the risks involved, stands in the street near the fire-
works to get a good view of them. A firework injures the plaintiff.
The plaintiff will be deemed to assume the risk in the secondary
sense.83 Because the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff by
dangerously setting off the fireworks, primary assumption of risk does
not apply to the situation. 4
i. secondary assumption of a reasonable risk
Under the rubric of secondary assumption of risk, courts recog-
nize the doctrines of secondary assumption of a reasonable risk and
secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk.85 Secondary assump-
tion of a reasonable risk generally means that the advantages to the
plaintiff in encountering the risk the defendant's negligence caused
outweigh the disadvantages. 86 In such a situation the plaintiff's as-
sumption of risk is considered "reasonable." Even though the plain-
tiff's conduct was reasonable, the defendant can still take advantage
of the defense.'
As an example, consider the tenant who is injured after entering
a burning apartment to save a child.88 Because the advantages to sav-
ing the child outweigh the disadvantages, the conduct is considered
reasonable. However, since the person acted voluntarily with knowl-
80. Id
81. Meistrich, 155 A.2d at 93.
82. See supra part II.A.
83. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 496C cmt. g.
84. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
85. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 481.
86. I
87. See id.
88. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977).
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edge and appreciation of the risk of being injured, secondary assump-
tion of a reasonable risk would bar recovery. 89
ii. secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk
Secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk, on the other
hand, occurs when the advantage to be gained in encountering a risk is
small when compared to the danger the plaintiff potentially will face. 90
Thus, a plaintiff who elects to run into a burning building to retrieve
an old hat has assumed an unreasonable risk of being injured.9' Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff cannot recover for that injury.
C. The Relationship Between Contributory Negligence, Comparative
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk
Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense to negligence.
It applies when the plaintiff's conduct falls below the conduct which a
person of ordinary prudence would conform for their own protec-
tion.92 The defense becomes relevant after the trier of fact finds that
the defendant has breached a duty and would otherwise be liable to
the plaintiff.93 The effect of the defense is to deny any recovery to the
plaintiff, even if the plaintiff is only one percent at fault.94
The hardship of this doctrine prompted many states to adopt a
system of comparative negligence.95 Although different forms of com-
parative negligence exist, the basic theory behind each form is the
same-apportionment of liability according to fault.96 For example,
under a comparative negligence system a plaintiff who is 30% respon-
sible for the damage arising from the defendant's negligent conduct
will get 70% of the damages the plaintiff would have gotten had the
plaintiff been 0% at fault. 7 Comparative negligence eliminates the
inequity that occurs under contributory negligence, where a plaintiff
who is only 1% at fault cannot recover anything.
89. See id.
90. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 481.
91. See i
92. Id. § 65, at 451.
93. Id. at 451-52.
94. I1&
95. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275
N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981); Bradley v. Appalach-
ian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 67, at 470-74.
96. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 67, at 470-74.
97. See id. at 468-73.
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To a certain degree assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence overlap. 8 Secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk in-
volves a plaintiff who confronts a risk where the danger incurred
outweighs the benefit of that conduct.99 In such a situation the plain-
tiff is also, by definition, engaging in conduct that falls below the stan-
dard of care an ordinary prudent person would use for his or her own
protection-the plaintiff is contributorily negligent.10 Recall the ex-
ample used above to illustrate secondary assumption of an unreasona-
ble risk-the plaintiff who runs into a burning house simply to
retrieve a hat. The plaintiff is not only engaging in conduct where the
risks outweigh the benefits but is also acting unreasonably.10 1 This
plaintiff therefore created an undue risk of harm to him or herself and
cannot recover in a contributory negligence jurisdiction.0 2 Since the
plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the risk and voluntarily
ran into the burning house, secondary assumption of an unreasonable
risk would also bar recovery.10 3
1I1. THE PREsENT STATE OF AsSUMPTION OF RISK IN CALIFORNIA
California adopted a comparative fault negligence scheme'014 in
Li v. Yellow Cab Co.1°5 In Li, the California Supreme Court dis-
cussed the effect of comparative negligence on assumption of risk, af-
ter noting that secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk and
contributory negligence overlap to some degree.0 6 The court went on
to declare that "the adoption of a system of comparative negligence
should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the
general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault...
[where] assumption of risk.., is no more than a variant of contribu-
tory negligence."' 07 Secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk,
therefore, became a dead letter in California.
The court also discussed primary assumption of risk. It stated
that while primary assumption of risk does not involve the considera-
98. See Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 881, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1977);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 495.
99. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 463 cmt. b.
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
105. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
106. Id. at 824,532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872. For a discussion on how contrib-
utory negligence and assumption of risk overlap, see supra part II.C.
107. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 825, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
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tions of contributory and comparative negligence, it does involve a
reduction of the defendant's duty of care.10 8
Since the Li court did not address secondary assumption of a rea-
sonable risk, courts of appeal were left to determine whether it re-
mained a viable defense. The California Supreme Court answered
this question in dicta in Knight v. Jewett.0 9 The case involved an in-
formal game of touch football during half time of the 1987 Super
Bowl." 0 Each team was comprised of four to five players that in-
cluded both men and women."' The plaintiff, Kendra Knight, and the
defendant, Michael Jewett, were on opposing teams." 2 During a play,
the defendant ran into the plaintiff." 3 The plaintiff alleged that she
then told the defendant to stop playing rough or she was going to have
to quit the game." 4 On the very next play, the defendant injured the
plaintiff.1' 5 The defendant claimed that he jumped to intercept a pass
and knocked the plaintiff to the ground." 6 The plaintiff claimed that
someone else had already caught the pass when the defendant struck
the plaintiff from behind while he was chasing the person in posses-
sion of the ball.117 The plaintiff injured her hand." 8 She had three
operations that failed to restore movement in her finger or relieve the
pain her injury caused." 9 Eventually, doctors amputated her
finger. 12
0
In a plurality decision, the court noted that prior to the adoption
of comparative fault there was no need to distinguish between the var-
ious categories of assumption of risk.'12 Whether a plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent or had assumed the risk, the plaintiff's recovery
was completely barred. 22 However, the court felt that with the adop-
tion of comparative fault it had become essential to differentiate be-
tween the types of assumption of risk. 2 '
108. Id. at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
109. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992).
110. Id. at 300, 834 P.2d at 697, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id., 834 P.2d at 697-98, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3-4.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 301, 834 P.2d at 698, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 304, 834 P.2d at 700, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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The plurality in Knight stated that Li contemplated the merger of
secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk with comparative
fault-1 and recognized the disparate treatment given secondary as-
sumption of a reasonable risk in the appellate courts since Li.125 A
majority of the court also declared that implied assumption of a rea-
sonable risk did not survive California's comparative fault scheme.126
The court chiefly relied on the unfairness that would result if it
retained secondary assumption of a reasonable risk after the merger
of secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk into the comparative
fault scheme." 7 If the court did not merge secondary assumption of a
reasonable risk into the comparative fault scheme, a plaintiff who ac-
ted reasonably in encountering a risk could be completely barred from
any recovery under that defense. If the plaintiff acted unreasonably in
encountering the risk, they would at least get some recovery under the
comparative negligence scheme, because the Li court merged secon-
dary assumption of an unreasonable risk into the comparative fault
scheme." 8 In short, the Knight plurality did not want someone who
acted unreasonably to be able to recover something while someone
who acted reasonably got nothing.1
29
The Knight plurality also discussed the effect comparative negli-
gence had on primary assumption of risk.' 31 It referred to the lan-
guage in Li that distinguished primary assumption of risk from
secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk13 and held that only
primary assumption of risk survived the adoption of comparative
fault.'
32
Having determined that primary assumption of risk remains a
complete bar to recovery in California, the next issue facing the
Knight court was how to determine which cases involve primary as-
sumption of risk rather than secondary assumption of risk.133 The plu-
124. 1& at 306, 834 P.2d at 701, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7. A majority of the court took this
view. Id. Justice Mosk joined the three judge plurality. Id- at 321, 834 P.2d at 712, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 18 (Mosk, J., concurring).
125. Id- at 307, 834 P.2d at 702, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8.
126. See id. at 321, 834 P.2d at 712, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (Mosk, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 306-07, 834 P.2d at 701-02, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7-8.
128. 1&
129. Id.
130. Id. at 308, 834 P.2d at 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
131. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
132. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 308, 834 P.2d at 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9. Only one justice,
Justice Mosk, would eliminate primary assumption of risk. Id. at 322, 834 P.2d at 712, 11
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (Mosk, J., concurring).
133. See id. at 309, 834 P.2d at 703-04, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9-10.
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rality first noted that in primary assumption of risk cases the
defendant does not owe the plaintiff a duty of care, but in secondary
assumption of risk cases the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of
care and has breached that duty."34 The plurality stated that whether
the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty does not depend on the rea-
sonableness or unreasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct.135 Rather,
it depends on (1) the nature of the activity or sport involved and (2)
the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or
sport.
13 6
Applying this two-part test to the facts before it, the Knight plu-
rality held that the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship
to that activity were such that the defendant did not have a legal duty
to protect the plaintiff from her injury. 37 Thus, primary assumption
of risk barred the plaintiff's recovery. 38
In applying the nature of the activity part of the test, the court
reasoned that the conduct at issue-the touch football game-inher-
ently involved dangerous activity. 39 The court further recognized
that although defendants do have a duty to use care not to increase
the risks already present in a sport, they do not have a duty to protect
plaintiffs against risks inherent in the activity itself. 40 Furthermore,
the plurality specifically stated that under its "duty approach" to as-
sumption of risk, the defendant does not need to demonstrate the
plaintiff's subjective knowledge and appreciation of the risk.141 Thus,
by adopting the duty approach, the plurality abandoned one of the
traditional elements of the assumption of risk defense: subjective
knowledge and appreciation of the risk.1 42
The court then focused on the second part of its test: the rela-
tionship of the plaintiff and the defendant to the touch football
game. 43 The plaintiff was a coparticipant, and the court referred to
"[t]he overwhelming majority of the cases, both within and outside
California... [that] have concluded that it is improper to hold a sports
participant liable to a coparticipant for ordinary careless conduct com-
134. l
135. Md at 314-15, 834 P.2d at 707-08, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13-14.
136. See id.
137. l at 321, 834 P.2d at 712, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
138. Id.
139. a i at 315, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
140. Id. at 316, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
141. Id., 834 P.2d at 709, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
142. See supra part ll.B.
143. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 317, 834 P.2d at 709, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
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mitted during the sport."1" The plurality found it persuasive that
"vigorous participation" in sports would be chilled if liability was im-
posed on a participant because his or her conduct was merely care-
less. 45 Based on its review of the nature of sports activities in general
and on the relationship that sports participants have with the sport
itself, the plurality held that a sports participant can only be held lia-
ble for intentional and reckless conduct that is totally outside the ac-
tivity normally involved in the sport.' 6
Justice Kennard's dissent maintained that secondary assumption
of a reasonable risk should remain a complete bar to recovery. 47 The
dissent accused the plurality of advocating a "radical transformation
of tort law" 8 and was particularly critical of the plurality's decision
"to recast the analysis of implied assumption of risk from a subjective
evaluation of what a particular plaintiff knew and appreciated... into
a determination of the presence or absence of duty legally imposed on
the defendant.
1 49
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Flaws in the Knight Plurality's Analytic Approach to
Secondary Assumption of Risk
The plurality in Knight stated that when the Li court adopted a
comparative fault regime, the Li court merged implied assumption of
an unreasonable risk with comparative fault.' 50 Even though contrib-
utory negligence and implied assumption of an unreasonable risk
overlap,' 51 the merger of the two was improper.
It is necessary to state briefly the argument for the merger of sec-
ondary implied assumption of an unreasonable risk with comparative
fault. Secondary implied assumption of an unreasonable risk and con-
tributory negligence often apply to the same case or the same set of
circumstances.' 52 Li adopted a comparative fault scheme because of
the inequity of the all or nothing contributory negligence defense.
53
144. Id at 318, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
145. Id
146. Id at 320, 834 P.2d at 711, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
147. Id at 324, 834 P.2d at 714, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
148. Id (Kennard, J., dissenting).
149. Id (Kennard, J., dissenting).
150. Id at 306, 834 P.2d at 701, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7; see supra note 124 and accompany-
ing text.
151. See supra part II.C.
152. See supra part II.C.
153. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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Since contributory negligence would apply in every secondary as-
sumption of an unreasonable risk case, the argument runs, the all or
nothing defense of secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk
would frustrate the principle of comparative fault. 54
Secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk and contributory
negligence, however, rest on different theoretical grounds. Because of
this distinction and because assumption of risk promotes different val-
ues than contributory negligence, namely individualism and freedom
of choice, secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk ought to
maintain a separate existence as a complete defense under Califor-
nia's comparative negligence scheme.
The following hypothetical exemplifies the distinction between
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Plaintiffs X and Y
are on a farm located in a farming community. Everything about the
plaintiffs is the same, except X has grown up on a farm, while Y is
from the city and has absolutely no knowledge about farm animals. X
and Y both enter a pasture with the farmer's permission to look at a
bull. X fully understands the risks of being in the vicinity of a bull,
while Y does not understand the existence of any danger. X and Y
get too close to the bull, and it attacks and injures both of them.
Assuming that the owner of the farm is negligent, X has knowl-
edge and appreciation of the risk and has confronted the risk volunta-
rily. Since approaching a bull involves great danger and little benefit,
X has impliedly assumed an unreasonable risk. Because X is acting
unreasonably and not exercising due care for her own safety, X is also
contributorily negligent.' Y is contributorily negligent as well.
156
But Y has not assumed any risk because he did not have the subjective
knowledge that it was risky to get close to a bull.'57
154. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 872 (1975).
155. The hypothetical assumes all of the traditional elements for the assumption of risk
defense have been met. Plaintiff X has voluntarily encountered a known and appreciated
risk. See supra part lI.A. Since Y is contributorily negligent, X most certainly is. See infra
note 156 and. accompanying text.
156. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 32, at 184. In defining the proper standard of
care that ought to be applied in a negligence case, Keeton notes:
[W]hen an ... individual who lacks the experience common to the particular
community comes into it, as in the case of the old lady from the city who comes to
the farm without ever having learned that a bull is a dangerous beast, the stan-
dard of ordinary knowledge will still be applied, and it is the individual who must
conform to the community, rather than vice versa.
Id Since plaintiff Y got too close to the bull and someone with ordinary knowledge in the
community would not have, plaintiff Y is contributorily negligent.
157. See supra part II.A.1.
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It is not difficult to determine how the Knight plurality would
rule as to plaintiffs X and Y. The hypothetical assumes the farmer
was negligent. Thus, primary assumption of the risk does not apply
because the farmer owed and breached a duty. 5 '
Since the Knight plurality held that secondary assumption of an
unreasonable risk was merged into the comparative fault scheme in
Li,15 9 the defendant farmer cannot use this as a defense with respect
to plaintiff X. However, X was also contributorily negligent, and the
farmer could succeed in reducing X's damage award under compara-
tive fault. The result would be the same for Y, regardless of the fact
that there was no assumption of risk issue with respect to Y.
Now assume the jurisdiction in the hypothetical is one that has
adopted comparative negligence and retained secondary assumption
of an unreasonable risk as a complete bar to the plaintiff's recov-
ery.16° Since X had knowledge and appreciation of the risk-the
bull-and acted voluntarily, secondary assumption of an unreasona-
ble risk would bar X's recovery. Y would likely recover some dam-
ages under comparative negligence. Assumption of risk does not
apply to Y, because Y had no knowledge or appreciation of the risk.
It could be argued that this result is unfair. Y will recover some-
thing under comparative fault while X will recover nothing because of
secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk. This would be the re-
sult even though X and Y did the exact same thing. Perhaps such a
result "seems to reward ignorance and penalize appreciation of the
risk";161 however,"the quality of the conduct of one who acts with the
benefit of greater knowledge is different from that of one who acts
without it."'
1 62
The conduct of the risk-assuming plaintiff is distinguishable from
the plaintiff who does not appreciate a risk, because the conduct of
the risk-assuming plaintiff approaches intentional conduct. Although
a plaintiff with knowledge and appreciation of a risk cannot be said to
158. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
160. Some states adopt this very approach. See O.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (West
1987); Osburn v. Pilgrim, 273 S.E.2d 118, 124 (Ga. 1980); Jackson v. City of Kansas City,
680 P.2d 877, 899-900 (Kan. 1984); Sandberg v. Hoogensen, 266 N.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Neb.
1978); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 332-33 (R.I. 1977); Un-
derberg v. Cain, 348 N.W.2d 145, 146 (S.D. 1984).
161. Keeton, supra note 31, at 158.
162. I& at 159.
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intentionally subject him or herself to injury,163 the conduct is akin to
intentional conduct because it comes close to satisfying the elements
for that type of conduct. "The three most basic elements... [of inten-
tional conduct] are that (1) it is a state of mind (2) about consequences
of an act ... and (3) it extends ... to having in mind a belief (or
knowledge) that given consequences are substantially certain to result
from the act."'" Certainly, the risk-assuming plaintiff has a state ofmind about consequences of an act. Knowledge and appreciation of
risk, by definition, mean that the plaintiff is thoughtful of the conse-
quences of his or her act. 65 Thus, plaintiff X in the hypothetical knew
that one consequence of getting too close to the bull would be that the
bull would chase after her. To the contrary, the plaintiff who is con-
tributorily negligent and who does not have knowledge and apprecia-
tion of a risk-plaintiff Y-cannot foresee the consequences of an act
because he does not comprehend the risk.
Less clear is whether the risk-assuming plaintiff is substantially
certain of the consequences of proceeding in the face of the known
risk. Most common are situations like the hypothetical above, where
the reward-getting close to a bull-would not induce the plaintiff to
incur a risk where injury is a substantially likely result. In such situa-
tions, it is not accurate to say the plaintiff is substantially certain injury
will result because the plaintiff cannot possibly be substantially certain
of the actions of a bull. However, the contributorily negligent plaintiff
who has not assumed any risk also cannot possibly be substantially
certain that injury will result from his or her actions. In many in-
stances, this plaintiff does not even comprehend the risk involved, 66
foreclosing all possibility of being substantially certain of a particular
injury.
Even though neither the risk-assuming plaintiff nor the contribu-
torily negligent plaintiff are intentionally acting to injure themselves,
comparing their conduct makes it clear that there is a sound basis for
allowing the contributorily negligent plaintiff partial recovery under
comparative fault while barring any of the risk-assuming plaintiff's re-
covery. Not only does the risk-assuming plaintiff meet the first two
elements of intentional conduct, unlike the contributorily negligent
163. See KEETON ET Ai-, supra note 2, § 8, at 36 ("[Mjere knowledge and appreciation
of a risk-something short of substantial certainty-is not intent.").
164. Id- at 34 (footnotes omitted).
165. See supra part II.A.1.
166. A contributorily negligent plaintiff who does not assume the risk usually does not
appreciate the risk, save those circumstances where he or she does appreciate the risk but
does not act voluntarily.
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plaintiff, the risk-assuming plaintiff is far more certain that injury will
occur because he or she has knowledge and appreciation of the partic-
ular risk involved. 167 Thus, the risk-assuming plaintiff's conduct is
much more intentional than the contributorily negligent plaintiff's
conduct. Because more responsibility should attach to intentional
conduct, 16 8 there is reason for barring the risk-assuming plaintiff's re-
covery while allowing partial recovery to the contributorily negligent
plaintiff. Thus, the adoption of comparative fault does not necessarily
warrant the abolition of secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk
as a separate doctrine.
The reasoning outlined above is buttressed by a well-accepted
negligence rule.169 An expert or a person who is particularly knowl-
edgeable of the dangers of some object "is judged by the standard of
an ordinarily prudent person with his exceptional knowledge.' 170
Therefore, the law demands that a person with superior knowledge
conduct him or herself consistently with that knowledge, while a per-
son without extra knowledge must only conduct him or herself as an
ordinary prudent person would.' 7' For example, if expert skiers are
privy to special accident avoidance techniques that ordinary skiers are
not aware of, the law will demand that the expert skiers conduct them-
selves consistently with their special knowledge. 72 Essentially, the
person who has, but does not use, the special knowledge to avoid
harm is more blameworthy than the person who lacks the knowledge.
The argument that the plaintiff who secondarily assumed an un-
reasonable risk should be treated differently from the contributorily
negligent plaintiff can be stated another way. Put simply, the risk-
assuming plaintiff has consented to the risk while the contributorily
negligent plaintiff has not consented to anything at all.'73 Whether the
risk-assuming plaintiff has consented to the risk or is acting more in-
tentionally, the differences between the contributorily negligent plain-
tiff and the plaintiff who has assumed an unreasonable risk warrant
the separate existence of implied assumption of an unreasonable risk
as a complete defense in a comparative negligence scheme.
167. See supra part II.A.1.
168. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 8, at 37; Ralph S. Bauer, The Degree of Moral
Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. Rnv. 586, 596 (1933).
169. See Keeton, supra note 31, at 158.
170. Id. at 158-59.
171. See id.
172. See LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730, 734 (10th Cir. 1977).
173. Keeton, supra note 31, at 159.
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The California Supreme Court should have made the distinction
between secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk and contribu-
tory negligence outlined above and retained secondary assumption of
an unreasonable risk to promote individual action and freedom of
choice. One of the purposes behind the formation of assumption of
risk was to promote individualism. 174 At the time of the doctrine's
inception, it was an important societal goal that each individual be
free to act as he or she chose. 175 It was felt that the individual should
be free from outside interference, and in the absence of interference
the individual was competent enough to protect him or herself.
176
Thus, the common law did not protect the individual from "the effects
of his own personality and from the consequences of his voluntary
actions.' 77
Although assumption of risk developed during the Industrial
Revolution, 78 individualism and freedom of action are goals that
should still be pursued today. All individual action has some effect on
the community's welfare.179 The individual has a better understand-
ing of his or her own needs than the government or any other body
and is better able to envision the goals he or she ought to pursue.'
Through the process of letting each individual choose the course of
action that is best for him or her, the common good is more likely to
result.' '8
The promotion of freedom of choice and individualism in the
context of assumption of risk has two consequences. First, the plain-
tiff should have freedom to do what he or she chooses to do. If pro-
ceeding in the face of a known risk is what the plaintiff wants to do,
the plaintiff should not be held back." Secondly, if the plaintiff is
injured after making a choice to proceed in a certain manner with full
knowledge and appreciation of the risk involved, the law should not
174. See Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARv. L. Rav. 14, 14
(1906). Bohlen states that assumption of risk was grounded in the "individualistic ten-
dency of the common law, which .. regard[ed] the freedom of individual action as the
keystone of the whole [legal] structure." Id.
175. See John H. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17,23-
24 (1961).
176. Bohlen, supra note 174, at 14.
177. Id.
178. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943).
179. See Mansfield, supra note 175, at 23.
180. Id. at 24.
181. Id
182. I& at 24.
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allow compensation for the undesirable results.'83 Allowing the plain-
tiff to recover would necessarily affect the defendant, because the de-
fendant would be required to compensate the plaintiff. Thus, the
defendant might respond by not offering the choice to confront the
risk out of fear of being held partially liable if the plaintiff is injured.
In turn, the plaintiff will no longer have the choice to engage in the
activity and society will be worse off."8
Thus, the Knight plurality's endorsement of the Li court's deci-
sion to abolish secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk as a doc-
trine separate from comparative fault rests on the failure to recognize
the difference between assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence.' 85 Moreover, the plurality appears to fail to recognize the sep-
arate policy reasons for treating the two doctrines differently.
86
The failure of the court to recognize the differences between the
two doctrines also led the plurality to declare the merger of secondary
assumption of a reasonable risk into the comparative fault scheme.
18 7
The Knight plurality argued that it would be unjust for the plaintiff
who acted unreasonably only to have his or her recovery reduced
under comparative fault while the plaintiff who acted reasonably
would be completely barred from recovery under assumption of
risk. 88 Thus, the Knight plurality held that the abolition of secondary
assumption of an unreasonable risk necessitated the abolition of sec-
ondary assumption of a reasonable risk.'89 Since the Li court should
not have merged secondary assumption of an unreasonable risk into
comparative fault, as discussed above, the Knight plurality was mis-
taken in abolishing secondary assumption of a reasonable risk. In-
stead, the Knight plurality should have taken the opportunity to
correct the mistake made in Li and infused secondary assumption of
an unreasonable risk with new life.
In summary, a ground exists for retaining secondary assumption
of risk as a doctrine distinct from comparative fault. Mainly, the risk-
assuming plaintiff's conduct is different from the contributorily negli-
gent plaintiff's conduct, because the risk-assuming plaintiff has
greater knowledge about the risks involved in an activity. The plain-
183. Id. at 25.
184. See id. at 27.
185. See Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 324, 834 P.2d at 714, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
186. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
187. See id. at 307, 834 P.2d at 702, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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tiff who is contributorily negligent-but who does not assume the
risk-acts without knowledge as to the risks involved, or cannot use
the knowledge to change his or her conduct. Thus, the risk-assuming
plaintiff is in a position to look out for him or herself while the con-
tributorily negligent plaintiff is not.
A ground for treating contributory negligence and secondary as-
sumption of risk differently is not enough. There needs to be a reason
for giving secondary assumption of risk a separate existence under a
comparative fault scheme. The plurality should have given secondary
assumption of risk a new life in order to promote individualism and
freedom of choice.
B. The Flaws in the Knight Plurality's Approach to Primary
Assumption of Risk
The Knight plurality held that primary assumption of risk remains
a complete bar to recovery.190 .However, the plurality dramatically
changed the doctrine. Traditionally, subjective knowledge and appre-
ciation of a voluntarily confronted risk have characterized primary as-
sumption of risk.191
Ignoring the traditional view of assumption of risk, the plurality
in Knight held that they would not attempt to ascertain the plaintiff's
subjective knowledge and appreciation of the risk under a duty ap-
proach to primary assumption of risk.' 92 The court believed that as-
sumption of risk should not depend on such "variable factors that the
defendant... [has] no way of ascertaining."' 93 Instead, the plurality
focused on the nature of the activity involved in the dispute and the
parties' relationship to that activity.' 94 If, based on these factors, a
court determines that the defendant does not owe the plaintiff a legal
duty, the Knight plurality stated that it should attach the label "pri-
mary assumption of risk" and completely bar the plaintiff's
recovery. 95
The Knight plurality's treatment of primary assumption of risk is
really no different than the inquiry into whether the defendant owes
the plaintiff a duty. This is exemplified by tracking the plurality's dis-
position of the Knight case itself.
190. Id- at 314-15, 834 P.2d at 707-08, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13-14.
191. See supra parts II.A.1, II.B.2.a.
192. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 312, 834 P.2d at 706, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 314-15, 834 P.2d at 707-08, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13-14.
195. See id at 314-15, 834 P.2d at 707-08, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13-14.
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The Knight plurality began its analysis by focusing on the duty
one participant in a sport owes to another. 96 It restated the rule that
it is "improper to hold a sports participant liable to a coparticipant for
ordinary careless conduct committed during the sport."' 97 It then
stated that "the conclusion that a coparticipant's duty of care should
be limited in this fashion [is supported by public policy]."'1 98 The plu-
rality went on to survey cases that have dealt with the liability of
sports participants, and, in particular, the standard of care used when
deciding whether one participant is liable to another. 199 After analyz-
ing these cases, the plurality concluded that "a participant in an active
sport breaches a legal duty of care to other participants... only if the
participant intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct
that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary
activity involved in the sport." 00 Disposing of the case, the plurality
determined that the defendant's conduct was neither intentional nor
reckless. 201
The plurality in Knight did not apply assumption of risk at all. If
any difference between primary assumption of risk and the element of
duty in the prima facie negligence case ever existed, it was the subjec-
tive analysis that traditionally accompanies assumption of risk. Fur-
thermore, the Knight plurality opinion is nothing more than a quest
for the duty of care applicable in each case. The Knight plurality ac-
knowledged this when it said "our resolution of [the case] turns on
whether, in light of the nature of the sporting activity in which defend-
ant and plaintiff were engaged, defendant's conduct breached a legal
duty of care to plaintiff.' '20 2 In effect, the plurality in Knight abolished
primary assumption of risk without acknowledging that they were do-
ing SO. 2
0 3
The primary assumption of risk doctrine, as the Knight plurality
uses it, stands for the concept of no duty and nothing more.20 4 Thus,
"the invocation of [primary] assumption of risk is superfluous, ' 0 5 be-
cause it really adds nothing more to the prima facie negligence case.
196. Id. at 318, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 319-20, 834 P.2d at 710-11, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16-17.
200. Id. at 320, 834 P.2d at 711, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
201. Id. at 320-21, 834 P.2d at 711-12, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18.
202. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14 (emphasis added).
203. See id. at 324, 834 P.2d at 714, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
204. See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
205. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 321, 834 P.2d at 712, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
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The plaintiff must already prove that the defendant had a duty to use
reasonable care toward the plaintiff.2"6 If no duty exists it would be
less confusing to say "the plaintiff did not prove his or her negligence
case" or "no duty existed" than to say the plaintiff is barred from re-
covery by primary assumption of risk.207 Thus, the Knight plurality
should have abolished primary assumption of risk rather than adopt
its duty approach to the doctrine.
C. A Proposed Definition for Primary Assumption of Risk
Even though California's version of primary assumption of risk is
a superfluous doctrine, California courts continue to use it.
208 Thus, it
is necessary for courts and practitioners to understand the difference
between primary and secondary assumption of risk. This section at-
tempts to clarify the difference between the two doctrines and criti-
cizes California's new method of labeling a case a "primary
assumption of risk case." Through this criticism emerges a proposal
for a different definition of primary assumption of risk.
In its attempt to distinguish between primary assumption of risk
and secondary assumption of risk, the Knight court stated that a pri-
mary assumption of the risk case is one where, "by virtue of the na-
ture of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the
defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the particu-
lar risk of harm that caused the injury. '209 A secondary assumption of
risk case is one where "the defendant does owe a duty of care to the
plaintiff, but the plaintiff proceeds to encounter a known risk imposed
by the defendant's breach of duty. '210 Applying this distinction to the
case before it, the Knight plurality focused on the particular duty a
sports participant owes to his or her coparticipant. The court stated:
Although defendants generally have no legal duty to
eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the
sport itself, it is well established that defendants generally do
have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a
participant over and above those inherent in the sport.
211
206. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
207. See id. at 321-22, 834 P.2d at 712-13, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18-19 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
208. See cases cited infra note 219.
209. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 314-15, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 315-16, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
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After discussing this general duty rule, the plurality added that "the
scope of the legal duty owed by a defendant frequently will also de-
pend on the defendant's role in, or relationship to, the sport." '212 The
plurality proceeded to apply these duty rules to the facts of the
case.
213
On its face, the Knight plurality's distinction between primary as-
sumption of risk and secondary assumption of risk appears to lie in
the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to that activity.
However, the court did not apply this test any differently than it
would apply a normal duty analysis. 214 Admittedly, the Knight plural-
ity analyzed cases involving the duty of persons participating in com-
petitive sports-the nature of the activity.21 5 It also analyzed the
coparticipant's duty-the parties' relationship to the activity.21 6 How-
ever, since Knight, and any other case, involves both an activity and
parties, an analysis of the nature of the activity and the parties' rela-
tionship to that activity is not a special analysis. Instead it is a search
for the ordinary duty of care that is a part of the prima facie negli-
gence case. The Knight plurality admitted this when it stated that its
goal was to determine the nature of the defendant's duty in the sports
context.21 7
Knight has not been applied any differently in the courts of ap-
peal. 218 In the few assumption of risk cases decided since Knight, the
focus is on duty.219 Since the courts of appeal rely on Knight, it fol-
212. Id at 317, 834 P.2d at 709, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
213. 1&
214. See supra part IV.B.
215. See Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315-17, 834 P.2d at 708-09, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14-15.
216. 1& at 318, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
217. See id. at 316-17, 834 P.2d at 709, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
218. See cases cited infra note 219.
219. See Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 19 Cal. App. 4th 578,584,23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671,674
(1993) ("[T]he critical inquiry is whether the riding stable owes a duty of care to riders who
rent horses for trail rides."); Bush v. Parents Without Partn6rs, 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 328-
30, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 181-82 (1993) (holding that dancing is not inherently dangerous so
primary assumption of risk does not apply); Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club, 16 Cal. App.
4th 817, 823, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270, 274 (1993) (holding that case involved secondary as-
sumption of risk because defendant had duty to avoid unreasonable risk of injury to plain-
tiff); Donohue v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., 16 Cal. App. 4th 658, 666, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
148, 152 (1993) (holding that slippery steps were not danger inherent in firefighter's inspec-
tion of building so case is secondary assumption of risk case); Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp.
v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 4th 547, 551, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24, 27 (1993) (holding that
nature of activity and parties' relationship to activity show case is one of secondary as-
sumption of risk); Curties v. Hill Top Developers, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1651, 1656, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 445, 448 (1993) (holding that case falls into secondary assumption of risk category
because defendants were required to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on
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lows that they are not using a special test made for primary assump-
tion of risk. For example, in Curties v. Hill Top Developers, Inc.,22
the plaintiff was injured in a fall while traversing a wet, sloping lawn in
front of the defendant's apartment building.221 Applying Knight, the
court discussed the effect assumption of risk had on the case. 2 2 It
held that the "case [fell] within the secondary assumption of risk cate-
gory.... [The defendant], as a property owner or manager, was re-
quired to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on its
property in order to avoid exposing tenants such as Curties to unrea-
sonable risks of harm." In essence, the Curties court reasoned that
since the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty under ordinary negli-
gence principles, the case was a secondary assumption of risk case.224
Thus, as in Knight itself, the application of the Knight plurality's test
in the appellate courts has been to determine whether the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty.225 If the answer to that question is no, pri-
mary assumption of risk bars the plaintiff's recovery; if the answer is
yes, the case is a secondary assumption of risk case and comparative
fault applies.
The California Supreme Court should adopt a new test to deter-
mine whether a case is a primary assumption of risk case. The way the
current test is applied gives the impression that every case is an as-
sumption of risk case. Certainly, not every case where the defendant
does not owe a duty to the plaintiff is a primary assumption of risk
case. Similarly, not every case where the defendant does owe the
plaintiff a duty is a secondary assumption of risk case. The label, as-
sumption of risk, has traditionally only applied to specific circum-
stances, rather than to every negligence case.2 6  Courts have
traditionally decided that primary assumption of risk applies given the
their property); Lucas v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 14 Cal. App. 4th 866, 872, 18 Cal. Rptr.
2d 79, 83 (1993) (holding that since statute provided duty of care, primary assumption of
risk did not apply); Davis v. Gaschler, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1392, 1401, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679,
685 (1992) (holding that because statute provided duty of care case was secondary assump-
tion of risk case); Stimson v. Carlson, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1201, 1205-06, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670,
673 (1992) (holding that moving mainsheets were fundamental risk of sailing, therefore
primary assumption of risk barred plaintiff's recovery).
220. 14 Cal. App. 4th 1651, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 (1993).
221. lML at 1654, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47.
222. Id. at 1655-56, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447-48 (citing Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315, 834 P.2d
at 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 2).
223. 1d& at 1656, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
226. See supra part H.A-B.
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facts of the case.2 7 Only after this has been determined does the
court lessen or abrogate the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.22 8 To
rectify these areas of its assumption of risk jurisprudence, and to assist
appellate courts in distinguishing primary from secondary assumption
of risk cases, the California Supreme Court should adopt a better ana-
lytical framework for determining whether a case involves primary as-
sumption of risk.
It is clear that primary assumption of risk cases involve plaintiffs
who are injured because of some risk inherent in the activity in which
they are participating. While it is true that the Knight plurality did not
refer to "inherent risks" when determining whether the case was a
primary assumption of risk case, and only used the term in determin-
ing a coparticipant's duty in the sports context,1 9 risks inherent in an
activity have always been a part of primary assumption of risk.10 Pri-
mary assumption of risk has its origins in the master-servant con-
text. 31 The master had a duty to provide a safe workplace, but if risks
inherent in the occupation remained, the master was not liable if the
servant was injured due to those risks2 3
However, problems arise if primary assumption of risk cases are
defined as those cases where a risk inherent in an activity caused the
plaintiff's injury. Judge Johnson's dissenting opinion in Hacker v. City
of Glendale233 offers a disadvantage to this approach.' The problem
with an inherency definition is that many risks are inherent in every
activity, and those inherent risks are usually the cause of a plaintiff's
injury.235 If primary assumption of risk applied to bar recovery by a
plaintiff who was injured by one of the many inherent risks in every
227. See, eg., Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 333-34, 834 P.2d at 720-21, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26-27
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
228. See supra parts II.A, II.B.2.a.
229. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
231. See supra part II.B.2.a.
232. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. Courts of appeal since Knight have
used the "inherent risk" concept in cases outside the sports and recreation context. See
Donohue, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 665,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152; Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 15
Cal. App. 4th at 563, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35.
233. 16 Cal. App. 4th 1419,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847, review granted and transferred, 859 P.2d
671, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (1993), and review denied and order directing publication denied,
1994 Cal. LEXIS 4836 (Cal. Sept. 7, 1994). Because the order directing publication was
denied, the opinion does not appear in California Appellate Reports; hereinafter the cita-
tions, to the appellate court's decision are only to West's California Reporter.
234. See id. at 865 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
235. See id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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activity, a plaintiff's recovery would be rare." 6 Judge Johnson offers
an example involving highway maintenance workers.2 7 In California
primary assumption of risk does not bar the recovery of a highway
worker who is hit by a car due to the driver's negligence. 38 However,
it is obvious that being hit by a car while working on the side of the
highway is an inherent risk in the highway worker's job. 39
In contrast to the highway worker, consider the firefighter who is
injured while fighting a fire that the defendant's negligence caused. It
is a well-accepted negligence rule that primary assumption of risk-or
a version of it-prohibits the firefighter's negligence suit.2 0 The prin-
ciple defining primary assumption of risk lies in the difference be-
tween the highway worker and the firefighter. Primary assumption of
risk bars the firefighter's recovery because the very nature of fighting
fires is to confront danger. 41 It is not the very nature of highway
maintenance to confront traffic. 42 To express this notion, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court should define primary assumption of risk cases as
those cases where a risk necessarily inherent in the activity caused the
plaintiff's injury. By necessarily inherent, in the activity I mean that
the risk is inevitably a part of the particular activity." 3
Using an inherency definition for primary assumption of risk can
become slippery. Necessarily, whether a particular set of facts consti-
tutes primary assumption of risk depends on the scope given to the
term inherent. My "necessarily inherent" definition is an attempt to
restrict the scope of the term in light of Judge Johnson's criticism. In
other words, the necessarily inherent definition for primary assump-
tion of risk is an attempt to limit the number of risks inherent in any
activity that will suffice for primary assumption of risk. It limits the
applicable risks to only those risks which are inevitably part of the
particular activity.
Another problem arises when courts and commentators use a
"risk inherent in the activity" definition to define primary assumption
of risk. It is often difficult to define the activity involved in any partic-
236. See UL (Johnson, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 864 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
239. Id (Johnson, J., dissenting).
240. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 309-10 n.5, 834 P.2d at 704 n.5, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10 n.5.
241. See Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 369, 644 P.2d 822, 826, 182 Cal. Rptr.
629, 633 (1982).
242. Hacker, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
243. A jury could decide this question without usurping the judge's role in determining
duty. See Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40,46,539 P.2d 36,39, 123 Cal. Rptr.
468, 471 (1975).
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ular case. Justice Kennard recognized this in her Knight dissent.'" In
her quest for the relevant activity, she stated:
"Touch football" is less the name of a game than it is a ge-
neric description that encompasses a broad spectrum of ac-
tivity. At one end of the spectrum is the "traditional"
aggressive sandlot game, in which the risk of being knocked
down and injured should be immediately apparent to even
the most casual observer. At the other end is the game that
a parent gently plays with young children, really little more
than a game of catch. 4 5
Consider, as another example, Bush v. Parents Without Part-
ners."4 In that case the defendant sponsored a dancing event. 47
When the plaintiff arrived, she observed a substance on the dance
floor that she thought was Ivory Snow Flakes.248 The plaintiff had
seen this substance used on the dance floor on prior occasions and was
aware that it made it easier for a dancer's foot to slide on the floor.249
The plaintiff waited until the floor was swept. °50 However, the sub-
stance was still visible on the dance floor when the plaintiff began to
dance.251 The plaintiff slipped and fell while dancing.252 A majority
of the court characterized the relevant activity in Bush as dancing. 
53
However, the dissent argued that "the activity was not just dancing; it
was dancing on a slippery floor."
'
1
5 4
Had the Knight plurality not abolished the subjective inquiry that
traditionally accompanies an assumption of risk analysis, the solution
to this problem would be to look at evidence of what the plaintiff
thought the activity was. However, under the plurality's new form of
primary assumption of risk, it is necessary to inquire into what a rea-
sonable person would think the activity is. Under my necessarily in-
herent definition, this would be a jury question." 5
244. See Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 335, 834 P.2d at 722, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
245. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
246. 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178 (1993).
247. Id at 325, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
248. Id
249. Id
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id
253. See id at 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
254. Id. at 330-31, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183 (Nicholson, J., dissenting).
255. This would not usurp a judge's role in determining duty as a question of law. See
Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471. I do not mean to give the
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To demonstrate how the necessarily inherent language should be
applied, it is necessary to revisit Knight and Ford v. Gouin,2 56 Knight's
companion case. In Knight the defendant injured the plaintiff while
they were both playing a touch football game. 57 Because the parties
disputed the facts, the precise manner in which the accident occurred
remains a mystery.258 The defendant claimed he jumped into the air
to intercept a pass and the plaintiff fell, landing on her hand.2 s9 The
plaintiff claimed that the ball was already caught and the defendant
ran her down from behind.260
It is undisputed that in games such as football "a participant's
normal energetic conduct often includes accidentally careless behav-
ior. '261 Due to this fact, participation in every football game includes
the risk of careless behavior and injury resulting from that behavior.
In other words, the risk of injury due to careless behavior is necessar-
ily inherent in every touch football game. Beside abolishing the sub-
jective inquiry and assuming it properly defined the relevant activity
as "football,1 62 the Knight plurality correctly determined the plain-
tiff's recovery was barred by primary assumption of risk.2 63
Ford v. Gouin involved a plaintiff who was water-skiing barefoot
and backward.2 4 The back of his head struck a tree limb that was
overhanging a channel of the Sacramento River Delta.265 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant was negligent in driving the boat too close
to the riverbank.266 In a motion for summary judgment, the defend-
ant asserted the assumption of risk defense.267 The defendant pointed
to the plaintiff's deposition testimony.268 The plaintiff had testified
impression that this is the best way to analyze the problem. Instead, I offer the only solu-
tion available due to the Knight plurality's distaste for the subjective inquiry.
256. 3 Cal. 4th 339, 834 P.2d 724, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992).
257. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 300, 834 P.2d at 697-98, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3-4.
258. Id. at 300-01, 834 P.2d at 697-98, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3-4.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 318, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
262. Under my analysis the jury would decide this question. Thus, in Knight the jury
would determine whether this was the type of football game in which a reasonable person
would expect the defendant's type of careless behavior. As Justice Kennard pointed out in
her Knight dissent, the definition of the activity is not always a simple classification. Id. at
335, 834 P.2d at 722, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-28 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
263. ML at 321, 834 P.2d at 712, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32.
264. Ford, 3 Cal. 4th at 342-43, 834 P.2d at 727, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32.
265. ld.
266. Id.
267. Id
268. Id.
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that he had been water-skiing barefoot and backward for two years
prior to the accident, although he could not ski over the boat's wake
without falling.26 9 He admitted that he selected the water-skiing site,
chose the length of the tow rope, and had skied in the area at least
fifty times in the past.270 Moreover, the plaintiff knew the sport was
risky.
1'
In the lead opinion, Justice Arabian relied on Knight to hold that
the defendant's conduct was not "so reckless as to be totally outside
the range of the ordinary activities involved in the sport."27 Accord-
ingly, primary assumption of risk barred the plaintiff's recovery.273
Under my necessarily inherent definition, primary assumption of
risk would not apply. However, this would depend on the jury's clas-
sification of the activity. It could decide that the activity involved in
Ford was water-skiing, water-skiing barefoot, water-skiing barefoot
and backward, or water-skiing barefoot and backward immediately
adjacent to a shore that has tree limbs hanging over it. A rational trier
of fact would not likely conclude the relevant activity is water-skiing
barefoot and backward immediately adjacent to a shore that has tree
limbs hanging over it. No evidence in Ford suggested the plaintiff was
water-skiing in the particular area because tree limbs overhung the
water there.
Using all of the activity definitions, except for the last, it seems
that hitting one's head on a tree limb is not necessarily inherent in-
or inevitably a part of-the particular activity. There are many risks
necessarily inherent in the sport of water-skiing. For example, a water
skier is often forced to ski over the wakes of other boats. The wakes
create rough water and could cause the plaintiff to fall and injure him
or herself. However, running into a branch overhanging the riverbank
is not part of water-skiing, barefoot water-skiing, or water-skiing bare-
foot and backward. Thus, contrary to the lead opinion in Ford, pri-
mary assumption of risk should not have barred the plaintiff's
recovery.274
269. Id
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 345, 834 P.2d at 727-28, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33-34.
273. See id.
274. The only justice in Ford to take the position that primary assumption of risk barred
the plaintiff's recovery was Justice Arabian. See id. at 350-51, 834 P.2d at 732, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 38. Justice Kennard's opinion argued that secondary assumption of risk barred
the plaintiff from recovery. Id at 363-64, 834 P.2d at 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (Kennard, J.,
concurring). Justice George, who was part of the Knight plurality, was of the opinion that
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It is less clear how the necessarily inherent test applies outside of
the sports and recreation arena. Suppose the defendant negligently
caused a car accident with the plaintiff. The risk of having a car acci-
dent seems to be necessarily inherent in or is ordinarily a part of driv-
ing, yet it is common knowledge that we do not assume the risk in
most car accident cases.27 5 The answer lies in the traditional assump-
tion of risk rule that the plaintiff must have knowledge and apprecia-
tion of the specific risk causing the injury, rather than the general risks
inherent in driving.276 The Knight plurality eschewed the use of a sub-
jective test.2 77 Thus, whether the particular plaintiff knew and appre-
ciated the specific risk of being hit by the defendant in the manner the
accident happened will have to be judged on an objectively reasonable
person standard. Since the objectively reasonable person cannot
likely predict the risks that lead to a particular accident,2 78 assumption
of risk does not apply in the ordinary car accident case.
Consider the facts of Hacker v. City of Glendale2 79 The deceased
was hired to trim a tree that had a power line passing through it.
280
He was electrocuted after coming into contact with a branch that
touched the power line.281 The court determined that the case was a
primary assumption of risk case, explaining that electrocution was an
inherent risk in the deceased's occupation?
Under the necessarily inherent test the trier of fact must first de-
termine the relevant activity. The activity issue is particularly impor-
tant under these facts because electrocution is probably not inherent
in ordinary tree trimming. This is especially true considering the nec-
essarily inherent test's policy of restricting the number of risks in an
activity that will suffice for primary assumption of risk.2 83 On the
other hand, if the activity is trimming a tree with an electric power line
Ford was not a primary assumption of risk case. See id. at 368-69, 834 P.2d at 744, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 50 (George, J., concurring and dissenting).
275. The court in Bush v. Parents Without Partners criticized the use of the inherent test
using this example. See Bush, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 329-30, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
276. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
277. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 316-17, 834 P.2d at 709, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
278. See James, supra note 60, at 150.
279. 16 Cal. App. 4th 1419,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847, review granted and transferred, 859 P.2d
671, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (1993), and review denied and order directing publication denied,
1994 Cal. LEXIS 4836 (Cal. Sept. 7, 1994).
280. Id. at 849.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 851.
283. See supra notes 229-44 and accompanying text.
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running through it, being electrocuted is necessarily inherent in that
activity.
It is clear from the facts of the case that the decendent knew the
power line ran through the tree before he gave his estimate for the
cost of the job.2&4 Moreover, he had turned down jobs in the past
because electrical wires might have interfered with his tree trim-
ming. 5 While trimming the tree involved in this case, the decedent
was careful not to touch the power lines and not to drop branches on
them.m6 Thus, it appears the activity involved was trimming a tree
with an electric power line running through it. Since the trier of fact
would likely determine that being electrocuted is necessarily inherent
in trimming a tree with a power line running through it, primary as-
sumption of risk would bar the plaintiff's recovery.
V. CONCLUSION
In its plurality decision in Knight v. Jewett,287 the California
Supreme Court emasculated the common-law defense of assumption
of risk. The plurality merged secondary assumption of risk into Cali-
fornia's comparative fault scheme, because it believed secondary as-
sumption of risk was duplicative of contributory negligence.288 To the
contrary, secondary assumption of risk encompasses a different form
of conduct than contributory negligence does.289 The risk-assuming
plaintiff's choice to confront a risk, by definition, is informed and vol-
untary. The contributorily negligent plaintiff's choice can be in-
formed and voluntary, but it does not have to be.291 Therefore, a
ground exists for retaining secondary assumption of risk as a complete
bar to recovery. The California Supreme Court should have used this
ground to retain secondary assumption of risk and to promote individ-
ualism and freedom of action.291 If defendants are held partially liable
for allowing plaintiffs to engage in certain activities, the range of activ-
ities offered to everyone is reduced.219 Moreover, since a person who
acts voluntarily with knowledge and appreciation of a risk can look
284. I& at 849.
285. Id-
286. I.
287. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992).
288. See supra part HI.
289. See supra part IV.A.
290. See supra part IV.A.
291. See supra part IV.A.
292. See supra part IV.A.
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out for him or herself, it is best to let him or her decide what conduct
to undertake. 93
The plurality in Knight purported to retain primary assumption
of risk as a complete bar to recovery in a negligence suit.294 However,
the plurality dramatically changed the doctrine by prohibiting an in-
quiry into the plaintiff's subjective state of mind.2 95 Furthermore, its
determination that a case is a primary assumption of risk case is no
different than the normal duty analysis in every negligence case.
2 96
Because the plurality applies primary assumption of risk in this way, it
should be abolished because it is a superfluous doctrine and only
serves to confuse courts and practitioners.29
Since courts have continued to use primary assumption of risk to
stand for a particular kind of case, I have tried to define the term.
298
Primary assumption of risk cases could be defined as those cases
where the risk that caused the injury is necessarily inherent in the ac-
tivity itself or where the risk is inevitably part of the activity.299
Whether this definition encompasses all primary assumption of risk
cases is difficult to determine. However, if the California Supreme
Court insists on retaining primary assumption of risk, it should give
the term its own meaning to clarify the doctrine. Perhaps in its quest
to define primary assumption of risk 3°0 the court will realize that it is
better to abolish the doctrine than to live with a doctrine that cannot
be expressed in simple terms.
Scott Giesler *
293. See supra part IV.A.
294. See supra part IV.B.
295. See supra part IV.B.
296. See supra part IV.B.
297. See supra part W.B.
298. See supra part IV.C.
299. See supra part IV.C.
300. The elimination of the subjective inquiry makes this particularly difficult.
* I extend appreciation and thanks to Professor David Leonard of Loyola Law
School for his generous help, insightful comments, and needed motivation. Thanks also to
the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all of their hard work.
[Vol. 28:1495
